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Fourth Circuit Summary
The Fourth Circuit Summary, begun last year, provides a
summary of prevailing environmental decisions decided by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
since the last issue of the William and Mary Journal of
Environmental Law. It does not cover every environmental
decision of the Fourth Circuit during that time period, but
only those cases which the editors believe to be of the most
interest to our subscribers. The Fourth Circuit Summary
will appear twice each year in the William and Mary
Environmental Law and Policy Review for the most timely
reporting.
RCRA
Owen Elec. Steel Co. of South Carolina v. Browner, No. 93-2195, 1994
WL 554656 (4th Cir. 1994)
Owen Electric Steel Company of South Carolina, Inc. ("Owen")
filed suit against EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner, appealing several
determinations by the Agency that a slag processing area ("SPA") owned
by Owen was a solid waste management unit ("SWMU").
Owen created "slag" as a byproduct of producing steel. Slag,
which contains limestone, dolomite and trace amounts of metallic oxides,
is continuously produced at Owen's Cayce, South Carolina facility. When
the slag is first produced, it is dimensionally unstable and must sit for six
months on bare soil at the facility for tempering and weathering in a
"curing" process. When the slag is stabilized, Owen sells the material to
the construction industry for use as a road base material or for other
commercial purposes. Because Owen's Cayce facility is one that treats,
stores or disposes of hazardous waste ("TSDF"), it must comply with the
Resource and Conservation Recovery Act ("RCRA") and obtain a permit
from EPA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3005, 6925. On October 6, 1989, EPA proposed
a permit for the Cayce facility that identified the SPA as an SWMU.
Owen disputed this classification and brought a' petition against Carol M.
Browner, EPA Administrator.
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The issue for the Fourth Circuit was whether the slag produced by
Owen as a byproduct of its steel production is "discarded" and therefore
a solid waste under RCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). Owen argued that its
slag is not discarded material because it is recycled and used in roadbeds.
EPA countered that the material is discarded because it lies dormant and
exposed on the ground for six months before it is reused.
Under Chevron US.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984), substantial deference is accorded to an agency's
interpretation of a statute when Congress has not expressly spoken on the
issue. Since Congress had not directly spoken on the issue here, the
Fourth Circuit cannot invalidate the agency interpretation if it is reasonable
and permissible and not an abuse of discretion. In an analysis of recent
cases, the Fourth Circuit determined that EPA could classify a byproduct
as discarded if it is not immediately recycled for use in the same industry.
Since Owen's slag must sit for six months before being recycled and is not
reused in the same industry but is instead sold to the construction industry
for use in their constructive processes, the Fourth Circuit held that EPA's
interpretation in determining that slag is a solid waste was reasonable and
not an abuse of discretion. The court, therefore, denied Owen's petition
for relief.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Appalachian Energy Group v. EPA, 33 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1994)
The Appalachian Energy Group and other oil and gas trade
associations sought judicial review of an internal EPA memorandum which
advised that the Clean Water Act ("CWA") requires a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit for storm water
discharges involving oil and gas construction activities. The Fourth Circuit
dismissed the application for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In response to an inquiry from the regional storm water coordinator,
the NPDES Program Branch Chief advised in a memorandum that the
CWA required an NPDES permit for "storm water discharges from
construction activities involving oil and gas facilities (e.g., access roads,
drilling pads, pipelines, etc.)." The oil and gas trade associations
contended that the memorandum was inconsistent with the CWA and that
it amounted to a new rule, adopted without proper notice under the
Administrative Procedure Act. Petitioners sought to invoke the court's
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jurisdiction under section 509(b)(1)(F) of the CWA, which provides for
review of an EPA Administrator's action in issuing or denying any permit.
Petitioners also relied on Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 966
F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1992), in which the Ninth Circuit found jurisdiction to
review EPA rules that regulate the underlying permit procedures.
The Fourth Circuit stated that it could not review the memorandum
because it did not issue or deny any permit, did not relate to any pending
application and did not constitute any final agency action. The
memorandum only provided the author's interpretation of two regulations
in tension under the CWA. The Fourth Circuit stated that while the
memorandum might signal a position EPA intended to take, EPA had not
taken any action which triggered the court's power to review.
The Fourth Circuit also found petitioner's reliance on Natural
Resources Defense Council v. EPA misplaced. The Ninth Circuit's ruling
involved actual activities related to the issuance and denial of permits.
Also, without citing any authority, it went on to state that it had the power
to review rules that regulate underlying permit procedures that were at
issue in that case. In contrast, the petitioners here could only state an
interest in knowing whether its members must obtain permits. Therefore,
the memorandum did not constitute agency action sufficient to provide
subject matter jurisdiction.
Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148 (4th Cir. 1994)
Plaintiffs brought an action against Columbia Organic Chemicals
Company's ("Columbia Organic") plant in Columbia, South Carolina,
alleging negligent operation of the plant due to its release of hazardous
substances into the soil, air and groundwater. The suit sought
compensatory damages and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs were residential and
commercial landowners within a one and one-half mile radius of
defendant's plant.
Columbia Organic removed the action to federal district court,
asserting that the complaint raised federal questions sufficient to confer
original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441 (which require
either diversity of citizenship between the parties or a federal question).
As one part of its negligence complaint, plaintiffs asserted that defendant's
violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"),
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
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("CERCLA"), and other federal statutes constituted negligence per se and
made the defendants liable for plaintiffs' injuries.
Plaintiffs disputed removal jurisdiction. The United States
Magistrate Judge recommended to the district court that the case be
remanded because the mere recitation of federal statutes was not enough
to confer federal question jurisdiction. The district court, however,
rejected the magistrate's recommendation, finding that it could retain
jurisdiction even though the federal issues were not essential to the
plaintiffs' case.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case
to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the cause of
action at issue was created by state law, the Fourth Circuit stated that
whether jurisdiction existed turned on whether the plaintiffs' demand
depended on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Analyzing
two United States Supreme Court decisions, the Fourth Circuit found that
when a federal statute raised by the plaintiff provides a private remedy,
then jurisdiction would exist only if Congress intended that such an action,
based on state law but incorporating federal law, be brought in federal
court. The federal statutes at issue provided a private remedy.
The court determined Congress' intent through two findings. First,
the plaintiffs sought compensatory damages and could not avail themselves
of this remedy under the statutes. Second, they were either procedurally
or substantively barred from proceeding under any of the statutes.
Therefore, Congress must not have intended for plaintiffs in the appellants'
position to pursue this action in federal court.
The Fourth Circuit also found that the claim involving the federal
statutes was simply an alternative theory. Applying the Supreme Court's
reasoning in a case under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) relating to jurisdiction over
patent cases, the Fourth Circuit held that a claim supported by alternative
theories in the complaint may not form a basis for subject matter
jurisdiction unless the federal law is essential to each theory. Because the
plaintiffs forwarded substantive theories that would not invoke federal
jurisdiction, the one alternative theory based on federal law could not
provide federal jurisdiction.
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NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
United States v. Stephenson, 29 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 1994)
Defendant Mack Stephenson was prosecuted for hunting bear within
the Great Smoky Mountains National Park ("the Park") in violation of 16
U.S.C. § 403h-3 (prohibiting hunting "within the limits" of a National
Park). Park officers placed a decoy within the boundaries of the north
shore of Fontana Lake, a reservoir located at the south end of the Park.
They spotted the defendant shooting at the bear from a boat on the lake.
While the National Park Service ("NPS") owns the land surrounding the
north end of Fontana Lake, the lake itself is within the custody of the
Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA"). The district court dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction because the decoy was not placed on land owned
by NPS and was therefore not within the limits of the Park as required by
§ 403h-3.
The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that the "within the limits"
language of the statute refers to the congressionally established boundaries
of the Park, not to actual agency ownership. The court focused on the
language of § 403k-1, which provides that "[s]ubject to valid existing
rights, all lands within the boundaries of the Great Smoky Mountains
National Park, [as defined by this title], hereafter shall be a part of the
national park and shall be subject to all laws, rules, and regulations
applicable to the national park." The Fourth Circuit found that the
language creates a strong presumption that the statutory boundaries of the
Park are the boundaries which are subject to Park laws, not just those
boundaries that are under the control of NPS.
The Defendant argued that because the decoy was on land owned
by TVA, the area was under the "subject to valid existing rights" exception
of the statute and was thus exempt from NPS jurisdiction. The Fourth
Circuit found no merit to this argument because Congress permits NPS to
exercise jurisdiction over lands held by other agencies pursuant to their
mutual agreement under § 17j-2(b). NPS had entered into an agreement
with TVA in 1948 that gave NPS the right to perform all acts "reasonably
necessary to the administration and use" of the Park on the land held by
TVA. The Fourth Circuit stated that both agencies agreed that this
provision included the use of NPS' police powers to protect Park
resources. Therefore, the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction
was reversed.
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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1241 (4th Cir. 1994)
Ethyl Corporation ("Ethyl") filed suit against EPA under the
Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") to compel the production of records
relevant to EPA's denial of a waiver of approval application for a gasoline
additive. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's decision to grant
EPA's motion for summary judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
In May 1990 Ethyl initiated an administrative proceeding before
EPA seeking approval of their use of a high-performance gasoline additive,
HITEC 3000. Section 211 of the Clean Air Act prohibits the use of a fuel
additive unless the user can show that the additive will not interfere with
any emission device or system. Expecting the proceeding to be protracted,
Ethyl filed a "fueled additive waiver" based on its own testing. EPA
denied the waiver, and on appeal the issue was remanded to EPA for
further proceedings.
In January 1992 Ethyl submitted a FOIA request for documents
relating to the denial of the waiver application. In response, EPA
produced approximately 450 documents but withheld an undisclosed
number of documents as "personal" and another 243 documents as
protected by the deliberative process exemption of the FOIA. 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(5) (protecting recommendations, draft documents, proposals,
suggestions and the subjective documents which reflect personal opinions
of the writer rather than those of the government agency).
When Ethyl moved to supplement the administrative record with
the documents EPA had produced, EPA produced twelve more documents
which it had originally withheld. Ethyl then filed an administrative appeal
of EPA's failure to provide all the documents and finally filed an action
in the district court seeking an order compelling EPA to provide the
remaining documents.
The district court ordered EPA to produce a Vaughn index, a list
of withheld documents described in sufficient detail so that a court can
determine whether the documents must be disclosed without resorting to
in camera review. The district court granted EPA's motion for summary
judgment on the basis of the Vaughn index and two affidavits. During the
district court proceedings, EPA produced eighty previously withheld
documents and identified several more.
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The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings,
holding (1) that material questions of fact existed regarding the
thoroughness of EPA's FOIA search, (2) that insufficient information was
provided in the Vaughn list for the court to determine whether the withheld
documents were protected by the deliberative process exemption, and (3)
that the court should have reviewed the withheld documents in camera if
it was satisfied that additional information could not be provided on the
Vaughn list without compromising the documents' confidentiality.
The Fourth Circuit stated that questions of fact remained as to
whether EPA conducted a sufficient search. The test for determining
whether the agency conducted a reasonable search was whether the search
was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents, not whether
every single document was in fact unearthed. The Fourth Circuit cited
several factors as to why the search may have been inadequate. First, EPA
did not properly instruct its employees conducting the search on how to
distinguish personal from agency records because the EPA official in
charge of the search informed the employees of only four of the ten factors
listed in EPA's FOIA manual. Second, the EPA official only contacted
fifty-nine employees in the search while Ethyl maintained that over one
hundred employees had worked on the waiver application. Finally,
seventeen documents were produced in a second, duplicative FOIA request
filed by Ethyl that were not previously produced.
Because the FOIA was enacted as a check against government
corruption, its exemptions are narrowly construed and the burden of
proving the exemption lies with the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
Because the Vaughn index is a surrogate for in camera review, it is
necessary that sufficient information be provided for the court to determine
adequately whether the exemption applies.
Under existing case law the author's identity and position in
addition to any recipients of the document should be disclosed if the
deliberative process exemption is to apply. EPA's Vaughn index did not
provide most of the withheld documents' authors or recipients.
Furthermore, many of the documents were only summaries or geographical
representations and would not qualify for the exemption. While most of
the documents' descriptions did not provide enough detail for a
determination of whether the documents qualified, those that were detailed
enough did not satisfy the exemption criteria. The Fourth Circuit also
found that not enough information was present for the court to determine
whether non-protected portions of documents could be released while the
protected portion was retained as required.
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In conclusion the Fourth Circuit noted that the district court should
have conducted an in camera review if EPA could not provide enough
information on the Vaughn index for the court to make a determination as
to whether EPA had satisfied its burden.
